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Abstract 
As examples such as the Monty Hall puzzle 
show, applying conditioning to update a proba­
bility distribution on a "naive space", which does 
not take into account the protocol used, can often 
lead to counterintuitive results. Here we exam­
ine why. A criterion known as CAR ("coarsening 
at random") in the statistical literature character­
izes when "naive" conditioning in a naive space 
works. We show that the CAR condition holds 
rather infrequently. We then consider more gen­
eralized notions of update such as Jeffrey condi­
tioning and minimizing relative entropy (MRE). 
We give a generalization of the CAR condi­
tion that characterizes when Jeffrey conditioning 
leads to appropriate answers, but show that there 
are no such conditions for MRE. This generalizes 
and interconnects previous results obtained in the 
literature on CAR and MRE. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Suppose an agent represents her uncertainty about a do­
main using a probability distribution. At some point, she 
receives some new information about the domain. How 
should she update her distribution in the light of this infor­
mation? Conditioning is by far the most common method 
in case the information comes in the form of an event. 
However, there are numerous well-known examples show­
�ng that naive conditioning can lead to problems. We give 
JUSt two of them here. 
Example 1.1: The Monty Hall puzzle [Mosteller 1965; vos 
Savant 1990]: Suppose that you're on a game show and 
given a choice of three doors. Behind one is a car; behind 
the others are goats. You pick door 1. Before opening door 
1, Monty Hall, the host (who knows what is behind each 
�oor) op�ns door 3, which has a goat. He then asks you 
If you still want to take what's behind door 1, or to take 
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what's behind door 2 instead. Should you switch? Assum­
ing that, initially, the car was equally likely to be behind 
each of the doors, naive conditioning suggests that, given 
that it is not behind door 3, it is equally likely to be be­
hind door 1 and door 2. Thus, there is no reason to switch. 
However, another argument suggests you should switch: if 
a goat is behind door I (which happens with probability 
2/3), switching helps; if a car is behind door I (which hap­
pens with probability 1/3), switching hurts. Which argu­
ment is right? I 
Example 1.2: The three-prisoners puzzle [Bar-Hillel and 
Falk 1982; Gardner 1961; Mosteller 1965]: Of three pris­
oners a, b, and c, two are to be executed, but a does not 
know which. Thus, a thinks that the probability that i will 
be executed is 2/3 for i E {a, b, c} . He says to the jailer, 
"Since either b or c is certainly going to be executed, you 
will give me no information about my own chances if you 
give me the name of one man, either b or c, who is going to 
be executed." But then, no matter what the jailer says, naive 
conditioning leads a to believe that his chance of execution 
went down from 2/3 to 1/2. I 
Why does naive conditioning give the wrong answer in 
these examples? As argued in [Halpern and Tuttle 1993; 
Shafer 1985], the real problem is that we are not condition­
ing in the right space. If we work in a larger "sophisticated" 
space, where we take the protocol used by Monty (in Ex­
ample 1.1) and the jailer (in Example 1.2) into account, 
�onditioning does deliver the right answer. Roughly speak­
mg. the sophisticated space consists of all the possible se­
quences of events that could happen (for example, what 
Monty would say in each circumstance, or what the jailer 
would say in each circumstance), with their probability.' 
However, working in the sophisticated space has problems 
too. For one thing, it is not always clear what the relevant 
proba�ilities in the sophisticated space are. For example, 
what IS the probability that the jailer says b if a is to be 
1The notio�s of "naive space" and "sophisticated space" will 
be formahz�d m SectiOn 2. This introduction is meant only to 
g1ve an mtmllve feel for the issues. 
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executed? Indeed, in some cases, it is not even clear what 
the elements of the larger space are. Moreover, even when 
the elements and the relevant probabilities are known, the 
size of the sophisticated space may become an issue, as the 
following example shows. 
Example 1.3: Suppose that a world describes which of 100 
people have a certain disease. A world can be character­
ized by a tuple of 100 Os and Is, where the ith component 
is 1 iff individual i has the disease. There are 2100 possi­
ble worlds. Further suppose that the "agent" in question 
is a computer system. Initially, the agent has no informa­
tion, and considers a112100 worlds equally likely. The agent 
then receives information that is assumed to be true about 
which world is the actual world. This information comes 
in the form of statements like "individual i is sick or indi­
vidual j is healthy" or "at least 7 people have the disease". 
Each such statement can be identified with a set of possi­
ble worlds. For example, the statement "at least 7 people 
have the disease" can be identified with the set of tuples 
with at least 7 Is. For simplicity, assume that the agent 
is given information saying "the actual world is in set U", 
for various sets U. Suppose at some point the agent has 
been told that the actual world is in U1, ... , Un. Then, af­
ter doing conditioning, the agent has a uniform probability 
on U1 n ... nUn. 
But how does the agent keep track of the worlds it considers 
possible? It certainly will not explicitly list them; there are 
simply too many. One possibility is that it keeps track of 
what it has been told; the possible worlds are then the ones 
consistent with what it has been told. But this leads to two 
obvious problems: checking for consistency with what it 
has been told may be hard, and if it has been told n things 
for large n, remembering them all may be infeasible. In 
situations where these two problems arise, an agent may 
not be able to condition appropriately. I 
Example 1.3 provides some motivation for working in the 
smaller, more naive space. Examples 1. 1 and 1.2 show that 
this is not always appropriate. Thus, an obvious question 
is when it is appropriate. It turns out that this question is 
highly relevant in the statistical areas of selectively reported 
data and missing data. Originally studied within these con­
texts [Rubin 1976; Dawid and Dickey 1977], it was later 
found that it also plays a fundamental role in the statistical 
work on survival analysis [Kieinbaum 1999]. Building on 
previous approaches, Heitjan and Rubin [1991] presented a 
necessary and sufficient condition for when conditioning in 
the "naive space" is appropriate. Nowadays this so-called 
CAR ( Coarsening at Random) condition is an established 
tool in survival analysis. (See [Gill, van der Laan, and 
Robins 1997; Nielsen 1998] for overviews.) We examine 
this criterion in our own, rather different context, and show 
that it applies rather rarely. 
We then show that the situation is even worse if the in­
formation does not come in the form of an event. For 
that case, several generalizations of conditioning have been 
proposed. Perhaps the best known are Jeffrey conditioning 
[Jeffrey 1968] (also known as Jeffrey's rule) and Minimum 
Relative Entropy (MRE) Updating [Kullback 1959; Shore 
and Johnson 1980] (also known as cross-entropy). Jeffrey 
conditioning is a generalization of ordinary conditioning; 
MRE updating is a generalization of Jeffrey conditioning. 
We show that Jeffrey conditioning, when applicable, can 
be justified under an appropriate generalization of the CAR 
condition. Although it has been argued, using mostly ax­
iomatic characterizations, that MRE updating (and hence 
also Jeffrey conditioning) is, when applicable, the only 
reasonable way to update probability (see, e.g., [Csiszar 
1991; Shore and Johnson 1980]), it is well known that 
there are situations where applying MRE leads to paradox­
ical, highly counterintuitive results [Seidenfeld 1986; van 
Fraassen 198 1]. 
Example 1.4: Consider the Judy Benjamin problem [van 
Fraassen 1981]: Judy is lost in a region that is divided into 
two halves, Blue and Red territory, each of which is fur­
ther divided into Headquarters Company area and Second 
Company area. A priori, Judy considers it equally likely 
that she is in any of these four quadrants. She contacts 
her own headquarters by radio, and is told "I can't be sure 
where you are. If you are in Red territory, the odds are 
3:1 that you are in HQ Company area ... " At this point the 
radio gives out. MRE updating on this information leads 
to a distribution where the posterior probability of being in 
Blue territory is greater than 1/2. Indeed, if HQ had said 
"If you are in Red territory, the odds are a : 1 that you are 
in HQ company area ... ", then for all a ¥ 1, according to 
MRE updating, the posterior probability of being in Blue 
territory is always greater than 1/2. I 
In [Grove and Halpern 1997], a "sophisticated space" 
is provided where conditioning gives what is arguably 
the more intuitive answer in the Judy Benjamin problem, 
namely that if HQ sends a message of the form "if you are 
in Red territory, then the odds are a : 1 that you are in HQ 
company area" then Judy's posterior probability of being 
in each of the two quadrants in Blue remains at 1/4. Sei­
denfeld [1986], strengthening results of Friedman and Shi­
mony [1971], showed that there is no sophisticated space 
in which conditioning will give the same answer as MRE 
in this case. (See also [Dawid 2001] for similar results 
along these lines.) We strengthen these results by show­
ing that, even in a class of much simpler situations (where 
Jeffrey conditioning cannot be applied), using MRE in the 
naive space corresponds to conditioning in the sophisti­
cated space in essentially only trivial cases. These results 
taken together show that generally speaking, working with 
the naive space, while an attractive approach, is likely to 
give highly misleading answers. That is the main message 
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of this paper. 
We remark that, although there are certain similarities, our 
results are quite different in spirit from the well-known re­
sults of Diaconis and Zabell [1986]. They considered when 
a posterior probability could be viewed as the result of con­
ditioning a prior probability on some larger space. By way 
of contrast, we have a fixed larger space in mind (the "so­
phisticated space"), and are interested in when conditioning 
in the naive space and the sophisticated space agree. 
It is also worth stressing that the distinction between the 
naive and the sophisticated space is entirely unrelated to 
the philosophical view that one has of probability and how 
one should do probabilistic inference. For example, the 
probabilities in the Monty Hall puzzle can be viewed as the 
participant's subjective probabilities about the location of 
the car and about what Monty will say under what circum­
stances; alternatively, they can be viewed as "frequentist" 
probabilities, inferred from watching the Monty Hall show 
on television for many weeks and then setting the proba­
bilities equal to observed frequencies. The problem we ad­
dress occurs both from a frequentist and from a subjective 
stance. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 
we formalize the notion of naive and sophisticated spaces. 
In Section 3, we consider the case where the information 
comes in the form of an event. We describe the CAR con­
dition and show by example how rarely it applies. In Sec­
tion 4 we consider the case where the information is not in 
the form of an event. We first consider situations where Jef­
frey conditioning can be applied. We show that Jeffrey con­
ditioning in the naive space gives the appropriate answer iff 
a generalized CAR condition holds. We then show that, ex­
cept in trivial cases, applying MRE in the naive space does 
not give the appropriate answer. We conclude with some 
discussion of the implication of these results in Section 5. 
2 NAIVE VS. SOPHISTICATED SPACES 
Our formal model is a special case of the multi-agent sys­
tems framework [Halpern and Fagin 1989], which is es­
sentially the same as that used in [Friedman and Halpern 
1997] to model belief revision. We assume that there is 
some external world in a set W, and an agent who makes 
observations or gets information about that world. We can 
describe the situation by a pair ( w, l), where w E W is the 
actual world, and l is the agent's local state, which essen­
tially characterizes her information. W is what we called 
the "naive space" in the introduction. For the purposes 
of this paper, we assume that I has the form (o1, ... , on), 
where oi is the observation that the agent makes at time j, 
j = 1, . . .  , n. This representation implicitly assumes that 
the agent remembers everything she has observed (since 
her local state encodes all the previous observations). Thus, 
we ignore memory issues here. We also ignore computa-
tiona! issues, just so as to be able to focus on when condi­
tioning is appropriate. 
A pair (w, (o1, ... ,on)) is called a global state. A run is a 
function from time to global states. Thus, if r is a run, then 
r(O), r(l), ... is a sequence of global states that, roughly 
speaking, is a complete description of what happens over 
time in one possible execution of the system. If r(m) = 
(w, (o1, ... ,om)), then we letrw(m) = w andro(m) = 
(o1, ... , om)· For simplicity, in this paper, we assume that 
the state of the world does not change over time, so that rw 
is a constant function. The "sophisticated space" is the set 
of all possible runs. 
In the Monty Hall puzzle, the naive space has three worlds, 
representing the three possible locations of the car. The so­
phisticated space describes what Monty would have said in 
all circumstances (i.e., Monty's protocol) as well as where 
the car is. The three-prisoners puzzle is treated in detail in 
Example 2.1 below. While in these cases the sophisticated 
space is still relatively simple, this is no longer the case for 
the Judy Benjamin puzzle. Although the naive space has 
only four elements, constructing the sophisticated space in­
volves considering all the things that HQ could have said, 
which is far from clear, and the conditions under which HQ 
says any particular thing. 
In general, not only is it not clear what the sophisticated 
space is, but the need for a sophisticated space and the form 
it must take may become clear only after the fact. For ex­
ample, in the Judy Benjamin problem, before contacting 
headquarters, Judy would almost certainly not have had a 
sophisticated space in mind (even assuming she was an ex­
pert in probability), and could not have known the form 
it would have to take until after hearing headquarter's re­
sponse. 
In any case, if the agent has a prior probability on the set n 
of possible runs in the sophisticated space, after hearing or 
observing (o1, ... , ok), she can condition, to get a posterior 
on n. Formally, the agent is conditioning her prior on the 
set n[ ( o1, ... , ok)] of runs where her local state at time k 
is (o1, ... ,ok). 
Clearly the agent's probability Pr on n induces a proba­
bility Prw on W by marginalization. We are interested in 
whether the agent can compute her posterior on W after 
observing (o1, ... , ok) in a relatively simple way, without 
having to work in the sophisticated space. 
Exam ple 2.1: Consider the three-prisoners puzzle in more 
detail. Here the naive space is W = { Wa, wb, We}, where 
Wx is the world where x is not executed. We are only in­
terested in runs of length 1, son = 1. The set 0 of obser­
vations (what agent can be told) is { { Wa, Wb}, { Wa, we}}. 
Here"{ wa, wb}" corresponds to the observation that either 
Wa or Wb will not be executed (i.e., the jailer saying "c will 
be executed"); similarly, { Wa, we} corresponds to the jailer 
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saying "b will be executed". The sophisticated space con­
sists of the four runs of the form (r(O) = ( w., ( )  );r(l) = 
(wx, ({ Wx, Wy})) where x f. y and { Wx, wy} f. { Wb, We} 
(since the jailer will not tell a that he will not be executed). 
According to the story, the prior Prw in the naive space 
has Prw(w) = 1/3 for wE W. The full prior Pr on R is 
not completely specified by the story, and will be discussed 
further in Example 3.3. I 
3 THE CAR CONDITION 
A particularly simple setting is where the agent observes or 
learns that the external world is in some set U � W. For 
simplicity, we assume that the agent makes only one ob­
servation, and makes it at the first step of the run 2 Thus, 
the set 0 of possible observations consists of subsets of 
W. However, 0 is not necessarily 2w. Some subsets may 
never be observed. For example, in Example 2.1, a is never 
told that he will be executed, so { Wb, we} is not observed. 
We assume that the agent's observations are accurate, in 
that if the agent observes U in a run r, then the actual 
world in r (i.e., rw(O)) is in U. In Example 2.1, accu­
racy is enforced by the requirement that r(l) has the form 
( Wx, ( { Wx, Wy})). 
The observation or information obtained does not have to 
be exactly of the form "the actual world is in U". It suffices 
that it is equivalent to such a statement. This is the case 
in both the Monty Hall puzzle and the three-prisoners puz­
zle. For example, in the three-prisoners puzzle, being told 
that b will be executed is essentially equivalent to observing 
{ Wa, We} (either a or c will not be executed). 
In this setting, we can ask whether, after observing U, the 
agent can compute her posterior on W by conditioning on 
U. Roughly speaking, this amounts to asking whether ob­
serving U is the same as discovering that U is true. This 
may not be the case in general-observing or being told 
U may carry more information than just the fact that U is 
true. For example, if for some reason a knows that the jailer 
would never say c if he could help it (so that, in particular, 
if b and c will be executed, then he will definitely say b), 
then hearing c (i.e., observing { Wa, Wb}) tells a much more 
than the fact that the true world is one of Wa or Wb. It says 
that the true world must be wb (for if the true world were 
wa. the jailer would have said b). 
For ease of exposition, in the remainder of this paper we as­
sume that W and R are finite, and that all nonempty subsets 
of R are measurable. Moreoever, whenever we speak of a 
distribution Pr over R, we implicitly assume that the prob­
ability of any set on which we condition is strictly greater 
than 0. Let R[ U] consist of all runs in R where the true 
world is in U (i.e., rw (0) E U). As before, let R[ ( U)] 
2We can easily extend the results to allow for multiple obser­
vations at many steps. 
consist of all runs where the agent observes U at the first 
step. Let Pr be a prior on R and let Pr' = Pr( ·I R[ ( U)]) be 
the posterior after observing U. Thus, we are interested in 
knowing whether Pr� (V ) = Prw (V I U); that is, whether 
the posterior on W induced by Pr' can be computed from 
the prior on W by conditioning on the observation. (Ex­
ample 3.3 below gives a concrete case.) We stress that Pr 
and Pr' are distributions on R, while Prw and Pr� are 
distributions on W (obtained by marginalization from Pr 
and Pr', respectively). 
The following simple proposition says that this can be done 
iff conditioning on U is equivalent to conditioning on ob­
serving U. 
Proposition 3.1: Let Pr' = Pr(-I R[ ( U) ]). Then Pr� = 
Prw (·I U) iff Pr(R[ V ]I R[ U]) = Pr(R[ V ]I R[ ( U)]) for 
allV � W. 
Now the obvious question is when Pr(R[ V ]I R[ U]) = 
Pr(R[ V ]I R[ ( U) ]). The CAR condition characterizes this. 
It is best stated in terms of random variables. Let X w 
and Xo be two random variables on R, where Xw is the 
actual world and X o is the first event observed. Thus, 
Xw(r) = rw(O) and Xo(r) = U ifro(l) = ( U). Note 
that R[ U] is Xw E U (that is, R[ U] = {r: Xw(r) E U}) 
and R[ ( U)] is Xo = U. 
Theorem 3.2: [Gill, van der Laan, and Robins 1997] Fix a 
probability Pr on R and a set U � W The following are 
equivalent: 
(a) JfPr(Xo = U) > 0, thenPr(Xw = w IXo = U) = 
Pr(X w = w I X w E U) for all w E U. 
(b) The event X w = w is independent of the event Xo = 
U given X w E U, for all w E U; 
(c) Pr(Xo = UI Xw = w) = Pr(Xo = UI Xw E U) 
for all w E U such that Pr(Xw = w) > 0; 
(d) Pr(Xo = U I Xw = w) = Pr(Xo = U I Xw = w') 
for all w, w' E U such that Pr(X w = w) > 0 and 
Pr(Xw = w') > 0. 
The proof of this and all other results can be found in the 
full paper (available at www.cwi.nl.rpdg). 
The first condition in Theorem 3.2 just says that 
Pr(R[ {w}]l R[ ( U)]) = Pr(R[ {w}]l R[ U]) for all w E 
W. Given that W is finite, this is clearly equivalent to the 
desired condition Pr(R[ V ]I R[ ( U)]) = Pr(R[ V ]I R[ U]). 
The third and fourth conditions justify the name "coarsen­
ing at random". Intuitively, first some world w E W is 
realized, and then some "coarsening mechanism" decides 
which event U � W such that w E U is revealed to the 
agent. The event U is called a "coarsening" of w. The 
-; 
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third and fourth conditions effectively say that the proba­
bility that w is coarsened to U is the same for all w E U. 
This means that the "coarsening mechanism" is such that 
the probability of observing U is not affected by the spe­
cific value of w E U that was realized. 
The CAR condition explains why conditioning in the naive 
space is not appropriate in the Monty Hall puzzle or the 
three-prisoners puzzle. We consider the three-prisoners 
puzzle in detail; a similar analysis applies to Monty Hall. 
Example 3.3: In the three-prisoners puzzle, what is a's 
prior distribution Pr on R? In Example 2.1 we assumed 
that the marginal distribution Prw over W is uniform. 
Apart from this, Pr is unspecified. Now suppose that a ob­
serves { Wa, We} ("the jailer says b"). Naive conditioning 
would lead a to adopt the distribution Prw (·I { Wa, We}). 
This distribution satisfies Prw ( Wa I { Wa, We}) = 1/2. 
Sophisticated conditioning leads a to adopt the distribu­
tion Pr' = Pr(·IR[ ( {wa,we})]). By part (d) of Theo­
rem 3.2, naive conditioning is appropriate (i.e., Pr� = 
Prw (-I { Wa, We}) only if the jailer is equally likely to 
say b in both worlds Wa and We. Since the jailer must 
say that b will be executed in world We, it follows that 
Pr(Xo = {wa,we} IXw = We)= 1. Thus, condition­
ing is appropriate only if the jailer's protocol is such that 
he definitely says b in wa, i.e., even if both band c are exe­
cuted. But if this is the case, when the jailer says c, condi­
tioning Prw on { Wa, Wb} is not appropriate, since then a 
knows that he will be executed. The world cannot be Wa, 
for then the jailer would have said b. I 
So when does the CAR condition hold? There is only one 
simple situation where it is guaranteed to hold. Roughly 
speaking, this is when the observations are pairwise dis­
joint. Given a system R, let 0 = {U1, . . . , Un} be the 
set of observations made in n. Let v; be the set of worlds 
where U; is observed; that is v; = {Xw(r) : Xo(r) = 
U;, r E R}, fori = 1, ... , n. Since we have assumed that 
observations are accurate, we must have that v; s::; U;. Let 
on = {V1, . . .  , Vn}. If the sets in on are pairwise dis­
joint, then for each probability distribution Pr on n and 
each world w E Vi such that Pr(Xw = w) > 0, it must 
be the case that Pr(Xo = Ui I Xw = w) = 1. Thus, 
part (d) of Theorem 3.2 applies. Note that, if the sets in 
0 are pairwise disjoint, then the sets in on must also be 
pairwise disjoint. Whenever the set on does not consist of 
pairwise disjoint subsets of W, one can construct distribu­
tions Pr over R such that the CAR condition does not hold. 
Summarizing: 
Proposition 3.4: The CAR condition holds for all distri­
butions Pr over R if and only if on consists of pairwise 
disjoint subsets ofW. 
Note that the sets in on are pairwise disjoint iff Xo can 
be viewed as a function on W (i.e., its value in a run r is 
completely determined by rw(O)). 
Are there other cases (combinations of W, 0 and distribu­
tions over R) when CAR holds? There are, but they are 
somewhat special. Although we have not bothered to try 
to get a complete characterization of when CAR holds­
this involves stating a number of linear equalities that must 
hold, and does not give much insight-the following exam­
ples show that, in general, it can be very difficult to satisfy 
CAR. 
Example 3.5: Suppose that 0 = {U1, U2}, and both U1 
and U2 are observed with positive probability. (This is the 
case for both Monty Hall and the three-prisoners puzzle.) 
Then the CAR condition (Theorem 3.2(c)) cannot hold for 
both U1 and Uz unless Pr(X w E U1 n U2) is either 0 
or 1. For suppose that Pr(Xo = U1) > 0, Pr(Xo = 
Uz) > 0, and 0 < Pr(X w E U1 n U2) < 1. Without 
loss of generality, there is some WI E ul -Uz and Wz E 
ul n Uz such that Pr(X w = Wl) > 0 and Pr(X w = 
w2) > 0. Since observations are accurate, we must have 
Pr(Xo = ul I X w = wl) = 1. If CAR holds for Ul, 
then we must have Pr(Xo = U1 I Xw = w2) = 1. But 
then Pr(Xo = U2l Xw = w2) = 0. But since Pr(Xo = 
U2) > 0, it follows that there is some W3 E u2 such that 
Pr(Xw = w3) > 0 and Pr(Xo = Uzl Xw = w3) > 0. 
This contradicts the CAR condition. I 
Example 3.6: Suppose that 0 = {U1, U2, U3}, and all 
three observations can be made with positive probability. It 
turns out that in this situation the CAR condition can hold, 
but only if (a) Pr(X w E U1 n U2 n U3) = 1 (i.e., all of 
U1, U2, and U3 must hold), (b) Pr(Xw E (U1 n U2) -
U3) U ((U2 n U3) -U1) U ((U1 n U3) -U2)) = 1 (i.e., 
exactly two of U1, U2, and U3 must hold), (c) Pr(Xw E 
(U1-(U2UU3))u(U2-(U1UU3))u(U3-(U2uUI))) = 1 
(i.e., exactly one of U1, U2, or U3 must hold), or (d) one of 
(U1-(Uz UU3)) U (U2 nU3), (U2-(U1 UU3)) U (U1 nU3) 
or (U3 -(U1 U U2)) U (U1 n U2) has probability I (either 
exactly one of U1, U2, or U3 holds, or the remaining two 
both hold). 
We first check that CAR can hold in all these cases. It 
should be clear that CAR can hold in case (a). More­
over, there are no constraints on Pr(Xo = U; I Xw = w) 
for w E U1 n U2 n U3 (except, by the CAR condition, 
for each fixed i, the probability must be the same for all 
w E U1 n U2 n U3, and the three probabilities must sum to 
I). Case (b) is the most interesting. Let v; be the set where 
exactly two of U1, U2, and U3 hold, and U; does not hold, 
fori = 1, 2, 3. Suppose that Pr(X w E V1 U V2 U V3) = 1. 
Note that, since all three observations can be made with 
positive probability, at least two of V1, V2, and V3 must 
have positive probability. If only two of them have posi­
tive probability, say vl and v2, then it immediately follows 
from the CAR condition that there must be some a with 
0 < a < 1 such thatPr(Xo = U3IXw = w) =a, 
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for all w E V1 U V2 such that Pr(X w = w) > 0. Thus, 
Pr(Xo = ul I X w = w) = 1- a for all wE v2 such that 
Pr(Xw = w) > 0, and Pr(Xo = U2l Xw = w) = 1-a 
for all w E V1 such that Pr(X w = w) > 0. If all of 
vl' v2' and v3  have positive probability, similar arguments 
show that the probability of each possible observation must 
be 1/2. For example, Pr(Xo = ul I X w = w) = 1/2 
for all w E V2 U V3 such that Pr(Xw = w) > 0. In 
case (c), it should also be clear that CAR can hold. More­
over, Pr(Xo = U;  I Xw = w) is either 0 or I, depending 
on whether w E U;. Finally, for case (d), suppose that 
Pr(Xw E U1 U (U2 n U3)) = 1. CAR holds iff there 
exists a such that Pr(Xo = U2l X w = w) = a and 
Pr(Xo = U3IXw = w) = 1-aforallw E U2nU3 such 
that Pr(Xw = w) > 0. (Of course, Pr(Xo = U1l Xw = 
w) = 1 for all w E U1 such that Pr(X w = w) > 0.) 
Now we show that CAR cannot hold in any other cases. 
First suppose that 0 < Pr(X w E U1 n U2 n U3) < 1. 
Choose w E U1 n U2 n U3 such that Pr(Xw = w) > 0, 
and letPr(Xo = U;IXw = w) =a;, fori= 1,2,3. 
Note that a1 + a2 + a3 = 1. Suppose w' � U1 n U2 n U3 
and Pr(X w = w') > 0. By the CAR condition, Pr(Xo = 
U; I Xw = w') is either a; or 0, depending on whether 
w' E U; or not. Since Pr(Xo = U1 I X w = w') + 
Pr(Xo = U2l X w = w') + Pr(Xo = U3l X w = w') = 
1, and at least one of these terms is 0, we get the desired 
contradiction. Similar arguments give a contradiction in all 
the other cases; we leave details to the reader. I 
Gill, van der Laan, and Robins [ 1997] show that for every 
finite set W of worlds, every set 0 of observations, and 
every distribution Pro over 0, there is a distribution Pr* 
over n such that the marginal of Pr* over 0 is Pr* and 
CAR holds. The authors summarize this as "CAR is every­
thing". Our examples show that the CAR condition puts 
quite severe restrictions on the distribution Pr* for which 
CAR holds. 
Given that CAR is so difficult to satisfy, the reader may 
wonder why there is so much study of the CAR condition 
in the statistics literature. The reason is that some of the 
special situations in which CAR holds often arise in miss­
ing data and survival analysis problems. Here is an exam­
ple. Suppose that the set of observations can be written as 
0 = U�=l 0;, where each 0; is a partition of W. Further 
suppose that observations are generated by the following 
process. Some i between I and k is chosen according to 
some arbitrary distribution Prs; independently, w E W is 
chosen according to Prw. Then the agent is shown U E 0; 
for the unique U E 0; such that w E U. Intuitively, the 
partitions 0; represent the observations that can be made 
with a particular sensor. Thus, Pr s determines the prob­
ability that a particular sensor is chosen; Prw determines 
the probability that a particular world is chosen. It is easy 
to see that this mechanism induces a distribution on n for 
which CAR holds. 
The important special case withO = 01U02,01 = {W}, 
and 02 = { { w} I w E W} corresponds to a simple miss­
ing data problem. Intuitively, either complete information 
is given, or there is no data at all. In this context, CAR 
is often called MAR: missing at random. In more realis­
tic MAR problems, we may observe a vector with some 
of its components missing. In such cases the CAR condi­
tion often still holds. More generally, Gill, van der Laan, 
and Robins [1997] show that in several problems of sur­
vival analysis, observations are generated according to a 
randomized monotone coarsening scheme under which the 
CAR condition holds. 
4 BEYOND OBSERVATIONS OF EVENTS 
4.1 JEFFREY CONDITIONING 
In the previous section, we assumed that the information 
received is of the form "the actual world is in U". But 
information does not always come in such nice packages. 
Perhaps the simplest generalization of this is to assume that 
there is a partition { U 1, . . .  , U n} of W and the agent ob­
serves a1U1; . . .  ;anUn, where a1 +···+···an= 1. 
This is to be interpreted as an observation that leads the 
agent to believe Ui with probability aj. for j = 1, . . .  , n. 
According to Jeffrey conditioning, 
Pr(V I a1U1; . . .  ; anUn) 
= a1 Pr(V I Ul) + . .  · +an Pr(V I Un)· 
Jeffrey conditioning is defined only if a; > 0 implies that 
Pr(U;) > 0; if a; = 0 and Pr(U;) = 0, then a; Pr(V I U;) 
is taken to be 0. Clearly ordinary conditioning is the spe­
cial case of Jeffrey conditioning where a; = 1 for some 
i so, as is standard, we deliberately use the same notation 
for updating using Jeffrey conditioning and ordinary con­
ditioning. 
We now want to determine when updating in the naive 
space using Jeffrey conditioning is appropriate. Thus, we 
assume that the agent's observations now have the form of 
a1U1; . . .  ;anUn for some partition {U1, . . .  ,Un} ofW. 
(Different observations may, in general, use different par­
titions.) Just as we did for the case that observations are 
events (Section 3, first paragraph), we once again assume 
that the agent's observations are accurate. What does that 
mean in the present context? We simply require that, con­
ditional on making the observation, the probability of U; 
really is a; fori = 1, ... , n. That is, fori = 1, . . .  , n, we 
have 
Pr(X w E U; I Xo = a1 U1; . . .  ; anUn) =a;. (I) 
This clearly generalizes the requirement of accuracy given 
in the case that the observations are events. 
Not surprisingly, there is a generalization of the CAR con­
dition that is needed to guarantee that Jeffrey conditioning 
can be applied to the naive space. 
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Theorem 4.1: Fix a probability Pr on R, a partztzon 
{U1, ... , U n} of W, and probabilities 0<1, ... , <Xn such 
that a1 + · · · + <Xn = 1. Let C be the observation 
a1 U1; ... , an U n· Then the following are equivalent: 
(a) IfPr(Xo =C) > 0, then Pr(Xw = w I Xo =C)= 
Prw(w I a1U1; ... ; <XnUn)· 
(b) Pr(Xo = CIXw = w) = Pr(Xo = CIXw E Ui) 
for all i = 1, . . .  , nand w E Ui su ch that Pr(X w = 
w) > 0. 
Part (b) of Theorem 4.1 is analogous to part (c) of Theo­
rem 3.2. There are a number of conditions equivalent to (b) 
that we could have stated, similar in spirit to the conditions 
in Theorem 3.2. Note that these are even more stringent 
conditions than are required for conditioning to be appro­
priate. 
Examples 3.5 and 3.6 already suggest that there are not 
too many nontrivial scenarios where applying Jeffrey con­
ditioning to the naive space is appropriate. However, just as 
for the original CAR condition, there do exist special situ­
ations in which generalized CAR is a realistic assumption. 
For ordinary CAR, we mentioned the situation where the 
set of observations 0 is a union of partitions, and a specific 
partition is chosen independently of the process realizing 
the "actual world" w (see the end of Section 3). For Jeffrey 
conditioning, a similar mechanism may be a realistic model 
in some situations where all observations refer to the same 
partition { U1, ... , U n} of W. We now describe a scenario 
for such a situation. Suppose 0 consists of k > 1 ob­
servations C1, ... , Ck with Ci := ail U1; ... ; <XinUn such 
that all <Xij > 0. Now, fix n (arbitrary) conditional dis­
tributions Prj, j = 1, ... , n, on W. Intuitively, Prj is 
Prw(·l Uj). Consider the following mechanism: first an 
observation Ci is chosen (according to some distribution 
Pro over 0); then a set Uj is chosen with probability <Xij 
(i.e., according to the distribution induced by ci ); finally, a 
world w E Uj is chosen according to PrJ. 
If the observation Ci and world w are generated this way, 
then the generalized CAR condition holds, that is, condi­
tioning in the sophisticated space coincides with Jeffrey 
conditioning. 
Proposition 4.2: Consider a partition {U1, ... , Un} ofW 
and a set of k observations 0 as above. For every distribu­
tionProover OwithPro(Ci) > Ofor alli E {1, . . . ,k}, 
there exists a distribution Pr over R such that Pro is the 
marginal ofPr on 0 and Pr satisfies the generalized CAR 
condition (part (b) of Theorem 4.1). 
Proposition 4.2 demonstrates that, even though the ana­
logue of the CAR condition expressed in Theorem 4.1 is 
hard to satisfy in general, at least if the set {U1, ... , Un} is 
the same for all observations, then there exist some priors 
Pr on R for which the CAR-analogue is satisfied for all 
observations. Below we will see that, in the case of MRE 
updating, this is not the case any more. 
4.2 MRE UPDATING 
What about cases where the constraints are not in the spe­
cial form where Jeffrey's conditioning can be applied? Per­
haps the most common approach in this case is to use MRE. 
Given a constraint (where a constraint is simply a set of 
probability distributions-intuitively, the distributions sat­
isfying the constraint) and a prior distribution Pr, the idea 
is to pick, among all distributions satisfying the constraints, 
the one that is "closest" to the prior distribution, where the 
"closeness" of Pr' to Pr is measured using relative entropy. 
The relative entropy between Pr' and Pr [Kullback and 
Leibler 195 1; Cover and Thomas 1991] is defined as 
"'"' , (Pr'(w) ) 
L Pr (w) log Pr(w) . wEW 
(The logarithm here is taken to the base 2; if Pr' ( w) = 0 
then Pr' ( w) log(Pr' ( w) j Pr( w)) is taken to be 0. This is 
reasonable since limx-;o x log(xfc) = 0 if c > 0.) The rel­
ative entropy is finite provided that Pr' is absolutely con· 
tinuous with respect to Pr, in that if Pr( w) = 0, then 
Pr' ( w) = 0, for all w E W. Otherwise, it is defined to 
be infinite. 
The constraints we consider here are all closed and convex 
sets of probability measures. In this case, it is known that 
there is a unique distribution that satisfies the constraints 
and minimizes the relative entropy. Given constraints C 
and a prior Pr, denote the distribution that minimizes rela­
tive entropy with respect to Pr given C as Pr( ·I C). 
If the constraints have the form to which Jeffrey's Rule is 
applicable, that is, if they have the form {Pr' : Pr' (Ui) = 
<Xi, i = 1, ... , n} for some partition {U1, ... , Un}, then it 
is well known that the distribution that minimizes entropy 
relative to a prior Pr is Pr( -1 a1U1; ... ,anUn) (see, e.g., 
[Diaconis and Zabell 1986]). Thus, MRE updating gener­
alizes Jeffrey conditioning (and hence also standard condi­
tioning). 
To study MRE updating in our framework, we assume 
that the observations are now arbitrary closed convex con­
straints on the probability measure. Again, we assume that 
the observations are accurate in that, conditional on making 
the observation, the constraints hold. For now, we focus on 
the simplest possible case that cannot be handled by Jeffrey 
updating. In this case, constraints (observations) still have 
the form a1U1; ... ; anUn, but now the Ui's do not have 
to form a partition (they may overlap and/or not cover W) 
and the <Xi do not have to sum to I. Such an observation is 
accurate if it satisfies (I), just as before. 
We now want an analogue to Theorems 3.2 and 4.1 show-
194 GRUNWALD & HALPERN UAI2002 
ing under what conditions applying MRE updating in the 
naive space leads to the same results as conditioning in 
the sophisticated space. Seidenfeld [1986] shows that, un­
der very weak conditions, no such analogue is possible if 
the observations have the form "the conditional probability 
of U given V is a" (as is the case in the Judy Benjamin 
problem). Here we show that even for observations of the 
much simpler form a1 U1; ... ; anUn, unless we can reduce 
the problem to Jeffrey conditioning (in which case Theo­
rem 4.1 applies), no such analogue is possible in general: 
if we cannot reduce the problem to Jeffrey conditioning, 
then MRE updating essentially almost never coincides with 
sophisticated conditioning. 
To demonstrate this, we focus on the simplest possible 
case. Let 0 consist of two observations (constraints), 
C; = a;1 U1; a;2U2, i = 1, 2, where U1 - U2, U1 n U2, 
U2 - U1 and W - (U1 U U2) are all nonempty. We further 
assume that au, a12, a21, a22 are all in (0, 1). Note that 
both C1 and C2 refer to the same events U1 and U2. 
We say that observation C = a1 U1; a2U2 is Jeffrey­
like iff, when MRE updating on one of the constraints 
a1 U1 or a2U2, the other constraint holds as well. That 
is, C is Jeffrey-like (with respect to Prw) if either 
Prw(U2I a1UI) = a2 or Prw(UI I a2U2) = a1. Sup­
pose that Prw(U2Ia1UI) = a2; then it is easy to show 
that Prw( ·l a1UI) = Prw(·l a1U1; a2U2). 
Intuitively, if the "closest" distribution Pr to Prw that sat­
isfies Pr(UI) = a1 also satisfies Pr(U2) = a2, then Pr is 
the closest distribution to Prw that satisfies the constraint 
C = a1U1; a2U2. Note that MRE updating on aU is 
equivalent to Jeffrey conditioning on aU; (1-a)(W- U). 
Thus, if C is Jeffrey-like, then updating with C is equiva­
lent to Jeffrey updating. The following theorem shows that, 
in general, if Cis not Jeffrey-like, then there may be no dis­
tribution Pr over n such that MRE updating coincides with 
conditioning in the sophisticated space; thus, there can be 
no equivalent to the CAR condition. 
Theorem 4.3: Let Pr be a distribution over R with 0 = 
{C�> C2} and Pr(Xo = CI), Pr(Xo = C2) > 0. Let 
Pri = Pr(·l R[(C;)J), and let Prtv be the marginal ofPri 
on W. If either C1 or C2 is not Jeffrey-like, then Prtv op 
Prw(·l C;).jor i = 1, 2. 
We can think of each possible observation a1 U1; a2 U2 (for 
fixed U1 and U2) as a vector in the set [0, 1 j2. Clearly the set 
of all Jeffrey-like observations is a subset of 0 (Lebesgue) 
measure of this set. Thus, the set of observations for which 
MRE conditioning corresponds to conditioning in the so­
phisticated space is a (Lebesgue) measure 0 set in the space 
of possible observations. 
Theorem 4.3 shows that, in the case where only two ob­
servations are possible, MRE cannot coincide with con­
ditioning in the sophisticated space unless both observa-
tions are Jeffrey-like. If we allow an arbitary number of 
observations rather than just two, then there may be some 
very special non-Jeffrey-like combinations of priors Pr and 
observations such that MRE updating corresponds to con­
ditioning in the sophisticated space. However, in marked 
contrast to the case for Jeffrey conditioning, these remain 
isolated cases. More specifically, Proposition 4.2 shows 
that, given an arbitrary set 0 of observations to which Jef­
frey conditioning can apply, where all the observations in 
0 refer to the same events, and a distribution Pr 0 on 0, 
we can always construct some distribution Pr over R such 
that Pr(Xo = C) = Pro(C) for all C E 0 and Pr satis­
fies the generalized CAR condition. Proposition 4.4 shows 
that, if the U; are allowed to overlap, this is not possible 
in general. We first need some terminology. For given sets 
W and 0 = { C1, . . .  , Ck}, we say (A1, ... , Ak) is CAR­
compatible iff there exists a distribution Pr over R with 
Pr(Xo = C;) = A; such that the generalized CAR condi­
tion holds. We let /::,. k stand for the unit simplex in R k. 
Proposition4.4: Fix an (arbitrary) set {U1, ... , Un} of 
subsets ofW such that (U1 n U2)- Ui=3 .. nU;, (U1- U2)­
Ui=3 .. nUi and (U2 - U1) - Ui=3 .. nUi are all nonempty. 
Suppose that there are k > 1 possible observations, 
C1, ... , Ck. with C; a;1 U1; ... ; a;nUn. such that all 
a;j > 0. Define 
S := {(AJ, ... ,Ak) E t:,.k: A is CAR-compatible.}. 
Then S is a subset of/::,. k of Lebesgue measure 0. 
Proposition 4.4 says that for all sets of observations 0 of a 
certain kind, almost all (that is, a measure I subset of) pri­
ors over observations are such that CAR cannot hold. To 
compare this with Theorem 4.3, note first that whether a 
constraint C; = a;1 U1; a;2U2 is Jeffrey-like depends not 
only on the a;j but also on the marginal prior distribution 
Prw over W. Theorem 4.3 says that for all sets of observa­
tions of a certain kind, all priors over worlds are such that 
for almost all observations, CAR cannot hold. 
5 DISCUSSION 
We have studied the circumstances under which ordinary 
conditioning, Jeffrey conditioning, and MRE updating in a 
naive space can be justified, where "justified" for us means 
"agrees with conditioning in the sophisticated space". The 
main message of this paper is that, except for quite spe­
cial cases, the three methods cannot be justified. Figure I 
summarizes the main insights of this paper in more detail. 
As we mentioned in the Introduction, the idea of compar­
ing an update rule in a "naive space" with conditioning in a 
"sophisticated space" is not new; it appears in the CAR lit­
erature and the MRE literature (as well as in papers such as 
[Halpern and Tuttle 1993] and [Dawid and Dickey 1977]). 
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observation set of observa- simplest applicable when it coincides with so-
type tions 0 update rule phisticated conditioning 
event pairwise disjoint naive conditioning iff CAR holds 
(Theorem 3.2) 
event arbitrary set of naive conditioning iff CAR holds 
events (Theorem 3.2) 
probability probabilities of Jeffrey iff generalization of CAR 
vector partition conditioning holds (Theorem 4.1) 
probability probabilities of MRE no general characterization 
vector overlapping sets 
Figure I: Conditions under which updating in the naive space coincides with conditioning in the sophisticated space. 
In addition to bringing these two strands of research to­
gether, our own contributions are the following: (a) we 
show that the CAR framework can be used as a general 
tool to demistify paradoxes of conditional probability; (b) 
we show that the CAR condition has a natural extension 
to cases where Jeffrey conditioning can be applied (Theo­
rem 4.1); (c) we show that no CAR-like condition can exist 
in general for cases where only MRE (and not Jeffrey) up­
dating can be applied (Theorem 4.3). 
Our results suggest that working in the naive space is rather 
problematic. On the other hand, as we observed in the in­
troduction, working in the sophisticated space (even assum­
ing it can be constructed) is problematic too. So what are 
the alternatives? 
For one thing, it is worth observing that MRE updating is 
not always so bad. In many successful practical applica­
tions, the "constraint" on which to update is of the form 
� 2:�=1 X; = t for some large n, where X; is the ith 
outcome of a random variable X on W. That is, we ob­
serve an empirical average of outcomes of X. In such a 
case, the MRE distribution is "close" (in the appropriate 
distance measure) to the distribution we arrive at by sophis­
ticated conditioning. That is, ifPr" = Prw(·l E(X) = t), 
Pr' = Pr(·l R[(� 2:�=1 X;= t)]), and Qn denotes then­
fold product of a probability distribution Q, then for suf­
ficiently large n, we have that (Pr")n � (Pr\v )n [van 
Carnpenhout and Cover 1981; Grunwald 2001]. Thus, in 
such cases MRE (almost) coincides with sophisticated con­
ditioning after all. (See [Dawid 2001] for a discussion of 
how this result can be reconciled with the results of Sec­
tion 4.) 
But when this special situation does not apply, it is worth 
asking whether there exists an approach for updating in the 
naive space that can be easily applied in practical situations, 
yet leads to better, in some formally provable sense, up­
dated distributions than the methods we have considered? 
A very interesting candidate, often informally applied by 
human agents, is to simply ignore the available extra infor­
mation. It turns out that in many situations this update rule 
behaves better, in a precise sense, than the three methods 
we have considered. This will be explored in future work. 
Our discussion here has focused completely on the prob­
abilistic case. However, these questions also make sense 
for other representations of uncertainty. Interestingly, in 
[Friedman and Halpern 1999], it is shown that AGM-style 
belief revision [Aichourr6n, Giirdenfors, and Makinson 
1985] can be represented in terms of conditioning using a 
qualitative representation of uncertainty called a plausibil­
ity measure; to do this, the plausibility measure must sat­
isfy the analogue of Theorem 3.2(a), so that observations 
carry no more information than the fact that they are true. 
No CAR-like condition is given to guarantee that this con­
dition holds for plausibility measures though. It would be 
interesting to know if there are analogues to CAR for other 
representations of uncertainty, such as possibility measures 
[Dubois and Prade 1990] or belie/functions [Shafer 1976]. 
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